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The United States has a longstanding policy of openness to foreign investment.1 And
for good reason. Foreign investment is widely viewed as a critical driver of U.S. economic
growth.2 It creates jobs, "spur[s] innovation," and facilitates trade in goods and services. 3
* Jonathan Wakely is an associate at Covington & Burling LLP where he regularly advises clients on
transactions before the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. Prior to joining Covington,
Mr. Wakely served for six years with the Central Intelligence Agency. He holds a B.A. from Haverford
College and a J.D. from Georgetown University.
** Lindsay Windsor is a law clerk for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. She holds a B.A.
from Cornell University, and an M.A. in Security Studies and a J.D. from Georgetown University. The views
expressed herein are my own and do not represent the views of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces or
the U.S. Government.
1. Every recent Presidential administration has explicitly stated a policy of openness to foreign invest-
ment. See Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Inv. Sec., Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Con-
ducted by CIUS on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74567, 74568 (Dec. 8, 2008) ("The
United States has a longstanding commitment to welcoming foreign investment."); Exec. Order No. 13,456,
73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 25, 2008) (noting that U.S. policy under President George Bush was "to support
unequivocally" international investment in the United States); President's Message to the Congress Transmit-
ting the 1990 Economic Report, 26 WEEKLY ComP. PRES. Doc. 180, 183 (Feb. 6, 1990) (expressing Presi-
dent Bush's continued commitment to open and competitive markets both domestically and abroad);
Statement by President Ronald Reagan on International Investment Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1214, 1216 (Sept. 9, 1983) (stating that "[t]he United States has consistently welcomed foreign direct invest-
ment in this country. Such investment provides substantial benefits to the United States."). President Barack
Obama has frequently re-affirmed this commitment. In May 2007, he recognized that "our prosperity and
security are founded on our country's openness." See Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Inv. Sec., Guidance
Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS on Foreign Investment in the United States, supra. In
October 2013, he announced the creation of "the first-ever, fully coordinated U.S. government effort" to
attract foreign direct investment in the United States. President Barack Obama, Remarks at SelectUSA Invest-
ment Summit, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/foreign-direct-investment/
president-obamas-remarks-selectusa-investment-sumnit-october-201 3/p 3 1769. He made "attracting foreign
investment a formal part of the portfolio for our ambassadors" and embassy staff and instituted measures to
help foreign investors navigate national, state, local rules and regulations. Id.
2. Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth, and Prosperity: The Case for a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment, WORLD ECON. F. (2013), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC13/VEF
GACGlobalTradeFDIFDIKeyDriverReport_2013.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: International Investment, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE http://
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/The /%20Facts /%2 0on /%201nternational /201nvestment.pdf (last visited Jan.
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Despite the myriad benefits of foreign investment, many countries-including the United
States-review certain inbound foreign investments for consistency with other policy pri-
orities, including national security. While some other countries' governments review all
foreign investments or all investments over a "specified value threshold[]," the United
States demonstrates its commitment to open investment by limiting its screening of in-
bound investment to a narrowly tailored process that reviews only a minority of foreign
investments, and then only for national security concerns. 4 Section 721 of the U.S. De-
fense Production Act (also known as the Exon-Florio Amendment) gives the President
authority to intervene in certain foreign investment transactions for the sole purpose of
protecting U.S. national security.5 The President, in turn, has delegated authority to re-
view transactions to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS),
an interagency committee chaired by the Department of the Treasury. 6 Over time, Con-
gress has adapted the framework for this review process to increase accountability and
transparency, and thereby to promote foreign investment while protecting U.S. national
security.7
In July 2014, the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia (DC Circuit)
issued the first ruling by a federal circuit court on the CFIUS framework8 The court
decided that CFIUS' procedures were constitutionally inadequate because they deprived a
Chinese investor of a property interest without due process of law.9 While the practical
effect of the decision is likely to be limited by the unusual circumstances of the case, the
decision is important because it underscores the need to manage carefilly the interplay
between U.S. national security interests and broader economic interests, and the critical
role that CFIUS plays in that process.
The DC Circuit, however, did not decide a much more fundamental question that has
great significance for U.S. foreign investment policy: CFIUS' authority to take action to
restrict or condition foreign investments absent action by the President.10 Because it is
exceedingly rare for transactions reviewed by CFIUS to reach the stage at which presiden-
tial action is required-indeed, there have only been two cases in which a President
blocked a transaction under Section 721, one of which was the subject of the Rails case" -
CFIUS' independent power is a vital consideration for foreign investors. The United
15, 2015) (observing that "[i]n a highly competitive global marketplace, openness to international investment
contributes to the diversity and vitality of the U.S. economy").
4. See Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS on Foreign Investment in the
United States, supra note 1, at 74568.
5. See generally Foreign Investment and National Security Act ("FINSA"), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (2012).
6. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975) (establishing the Committee).
7. CFIUS was first established in 1975 to help the president determine national security risks associated
with foreign investment in the United States. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975);
Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988). Congress codified CFIUS and outlined its
authorities and the President's powers in the 1998 Exon-Florio amendment. Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 1000-418 § 5021, 102 Star. 11108 (1988). See also H.R. Rep. No. 110-24, at
1 (2007), reprinted in 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N 102, 102 (stating that the congressional intent of the most recent
amendments to the statute is "[t]o ensure national security while promoting foreign investment and the crea-
tion and maintenance of jobs.").
8. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S. (Rails 111), 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
9. Id. at 321.
10. Id. at 325 & n.23.
11. See id. at 306; see also infra note 27.
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States District Court for the District of Columbia (District Court) must address this issue
on remand.12
This article reviews the DC Circuit's opinion and addresses how the District Court
should answer this open question. We conclude that there are regulatory, statutory, and
constitutional limits on CFIUS' authority in the absence of presidential action. We iden-
tify four ways in which CFIUS' authority is bounded: by due process, by scope, by time,
and by geography. We also conclude that an interpretation of the scope of CFIUS' au-
thority must be informed by the longstanding, bipartisan policy of openness to foreign
investment. In this context, courts must construe the CFIUS framework as narrowly tai-
lored and carefilly circumscribed to place no greater limitation on foreign investment
than is necessary for the protection of national security.
The scope of CFIUS' authority and its impact on U.S. foreign investment policy is
more important now than ever. In 2013, for the first time in history, China surpassed the
United Kingdom as the country with the most investments reviewed by CFIUS.13 In the
first quarter of 2014, Chinese companies announced investments totaling over six billion
dollars in the technology sector alone.14 As investment by Chinese companies in the
United States expands, U.S. policymakers will be increasingly faced with two realities.
First, foreign investment-including investment from China-is critical to grow the U.S.
economy.' 5 Second, in certain circumstances, foreign investments will present risks to
U.S. national security.' 6 CFIUS is designed to be a narrowly tailored mechanism that can
manage these two realities. The issue left open by the appeals court in Ralls namely,
CFIUS' authority to limit, condition, or restrict foreign investments in the absence of
presidential action-goes to the heart of how the United States maintains its policy of
open investment in a changing investment environment.
I. Background
We begin with a brief overview of the factual background of the DC Circuit's Ralls
decision, and continue by explaining the statutory framework pursuant to which CFIUS
operates. We then provide an overview of the current economic, political, and national
security context for foreign investment.
A. THE RALLS CASE
In March 2012, Ralls Corporation (Ralls), a company owned by two Chinese nationals,
purchased four American wind farm companies in Oregon.'7 The company intended to
install Chinese-made turbines within or near restricted airspace associated with a U.S.
Navy base.' 8 On June 28, 2012, after consummating the transaction, Ralls "submitted a
12. Rails Ill, 758 F.3d at 325 & n.23.
13. CFIUS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 16 (2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/
2013 %20CFIUSo20Annualo20Reporto20PUBLIC.pdf.
14. THILO HANEMMANN & DANIEL H. ROSEN, HIGH TECH: THE NEXT WAVE OF CHINESE INVESTMENT
IN AmERICA 9 (2014), http://asiasociety.org/files/China Hi TechReport.pdf.
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. On Foreign Inv. in the U.S. (Ralls 1), 926 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75-76 (D.D.C. 2013).
18. Id. at 76; RaIls III, 758 F.3d at 305.
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voluntary notice to CFIUS" informing the Committee of its recent acquisition. 9 Typi-
cally, parties to a transaction that falls within CFIUS' jurisdiction and that may implicate
national security concerns seek the Committee's pre-approval for a transaction.2 0 Here,
though, Ralls sought approval only after the transaction was complete.21
On June 28, 2012, Ralls submitted a voluntary notice to CFIUS.22 Twenty-seven days
later, CFIUS issued an interim order on July 25 (subsequently amended on August 2)
determining that the acquisition was a "covered transaction," meaning that it fell within
CFIUS' jurisdiction, and that the transaction presented national security risks.2 3 The or-
der further imposed "mitigation measures" designed to mitigate the risk to U.S. national
security presented by the transaction. 24 These measures included requiring Ralls to "cease
all construction and operations," "remove all stockpiled or stored items from the sites,"
and "cease all access to the project sites" except for removal of items by U.S. citizens. 2
The order further prohibited the sale of the wind farm companies to any third party ab-
sent CFIUS approval.26 Subsequently, in only the second time this authority has been
invoked, the President issued an order on September 28, 2012, prohibiting the transac-
tion, ordering Ralls to divest the assets, and imposing other conditions on the disposition
of the projects and turbines. 27
Rails sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court. 28 It challenged both
the CFIUS Interim Order and, later, the Presidential Order.29 The District Court held
that it lacked jurisdiction to review several of Rails' claims because Section 721 provides
that the President's actions pursuant thereto "shall not be subject to judicial review." 30
The court did, however, consider Rails' due process challenge to the Presidential Order
and rejected the claim on its merits.3 ' It also rejected as moot Rails' request for review of
the CFIUS Interim Order because the Presidential Order had specifically revoked it.32
Rails appealed this decision to the DC Circuit.
19. Ralls I, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
20. See 50 U.S.C. App. §2170(b)(1)(C)(i); see also Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted
by CFIUS on Foreign Investment in the United States, supra note 1, at 74567.
21. Rails I, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 89; see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(a) (2013) ("A party or parties to a proposed or
completed transaction may file a voluntary notice of the transaction with the Committee.").
22. Raills I, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
23. Id. at 79 (discussing CFIUS' Order Establishing Interim Mitigation Measures of July 25, 2012




27. Order Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by Ralls Corporation,
77 FR 60281 (Sept. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Presidential Order]. In 1989, the state-owned China National
Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation acquired Mamco Manufacturing Company, a Seattle-based
aerospace parts manufacturer. Using his Section 721 power, President Bush ordered the Chinese corporation
to divest itself of the U.S. manufacturer. Order Pursuant to Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of
1950, 55 FR 3935 (Feb. 1, 1990).
28. See Rails I, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 76, 81.
29. Rails Ill, 758 F.3d at 306.
30. Rails I, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (internal quotations omitted) (citing 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(e) (2012)).
31. See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S. (RaIls I1), 987 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2013).
32. Raills I, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
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A three-judge panel of the DC Circuit reversed.33 It agreed with the District Court
that the statute did not bar judicial review of a constitutional claim concerning the due
process afforded to Ralls, even though the statute bars the judiciary from reviewing the
President's substantive decision to suspend or prohibit a transaction. 34 The DC Circuit
reversed on the grounds that Ralls had acquired a constitutionally protected property in-
terest and did not receive due process when the Presidential Order deprived the company
of that property interest.35 "Ralls possessed state law property interests when it acquired
100% ownership" of the wind farm companies, the court held, and such rights "fully
vested upon the completion of the transaction, meaning due process protections necessa-
rily attached. ' 36 Further, Ralls did not waive its property interest by failing to seek
CFIUS' pre-approval of the acquisition, because "the regulatory scheme expressly con-
templates" that an acquiring company could seek approval either before or after the
transaction. 37
The DC Circuit next asked the question: "What process is due?" 3 8 It concluded that
"the right to know the factual basis for the action and the opportunity to rebut the evi-
dence supporting that action are essential components of due process." 39 Ralls was enti-
tled to review the unclassified information upon which the President's decision was based
and an opportunity to rebut that information.40 Given the national security context of the
CFIUS process, the court held that "due process does not require disclosure of classified
information supporting official action." 41 Still, because the President issued his order
without an opportunity for Rails to know or rebut the factual evidence supporting it, the
order deprived Rails of its vested property interests without due process of law.42
The DC Circuit also rejected the argument that Rails' challenge to the CFIUS Interim
Order was moot.4 3 Though the Presidential Order revoked the CFIUS Interim Order by
its terms and deprived it of any effect, the DC Circuit agreed with Rails that its challenge
to the CFIUS Interim Order fell under the "capable of repetition yet evading review"
33. Rails III, 758 F.3d at 301.
34. Id. at 311 ("The text [of the statute] does not, however, refer to the reviewability of a constitutional
claim challenging the process preceding such presidential action.") (emphasis in original).
35. See id. at 319.
36. Id. at 315, 316.
37. Id. at 317.
38. Rails III, 758 F.3d at 317.
39. Id. at 318.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 319-20.
43. See Rails I1, 758 F.3d at 321-25.
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exception to the mootness doctrine. 44 As a result, on remand the District Court must
address the merits of Ralls' challenge to the CFIUS Interim Order.45
How the court addresses this open issue could have a practical impact on the scope of
CFIUS' authority. It also could significantly affect the rights of parties before the Com-
mittee, and thereby have real implications for U.S. investment policy.
B. THE FRALMEWORK FOR CFIUS ACTION
CFIUS is an inter-agency committee chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury.46 Sec-
tion 721 gives CFIUS authority to review a "covered transaction," which is "any merger,
acquisition, or takeover ... by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign
control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States."' 47 Either
upon notification by the parties, or by its own initiative, CFIUS conducts a review "to
determine the effects of the transaction on the national security of the United States." 48
This review must be completed within thirty days. 49 During this time, parties to a trans-
action can submit additional information about the transaction to CFIUS and can propose
modifications to the transaction or other measures to mitigate any perceived risk to the
United States that arises from the transaction.5 0 If CFIUS determines that the risk is
mitigated, the review is complete and CFIUS submits a final investigation report to Con-
gress.5 ' However, if CFIUS determines that the transaction still presents a risk to U.S.
national security, it must "immediately conduct an investigation of the effects of [the]
covered transaction" on U.S. national security.5 2 This investigation must be completed
within forty-five days, during which time the parties again may submit information and
propose mitigation measures.
5 3
As part of the investigation, CFIUS is authorized to "take any necessary actions in connec-
tion with the transaction to protect . . . national security."5 4 To this end, CFIUS may
44. As the DC Circuit noted, a claim must meet a two-part test to fall under this exception. "[A] party must
demonstrate that '(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation
or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to
the same action again."' Id. at 321 (second alteration added) (quoting Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699,
704 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc)). The court found Ralls' claim met the test because (1) CFUS' authority to
issue an issue an order can last, at most, ninety days, so a CFIUS order is too short-lived" to be fully
litigated; and (2) Ralls intends to continue purchasing wind farms elsewhere in the United States, so there is
"some likelihood" CFIUS will respond similarly to other Ralls acquisitions in the future. Id. at 323, 325.
45. Id. at 325 & n.23. To implement the judgment of the DC Circuit, the District Court on November 6,
2014, ordered CFIUS to provide Ralls "with access to all unclassified material" which it compiled and relied
upon in making its recommendation to the President. Order in Ralls Corp. v. Comm. On Foreign Inv. in the
U.S., Civil Action No. 12-cv- 1513-ABJ (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2014). CFIUS must also give Ralls "the opportunity
to respond to and/or rebut" this information and consider Ralls' response in issuing an updated recommenda-
tion to the President. Id.
46. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(k)(3) (2012).
47. Id. § 2170 (a)(3).
48. Id. §§ 2170(b)(1)(A)(i), 2170(b)(1)(C)(i), 2170(b)(1)(D).
49. Id. § 2170(b)(1)(E).
50. Id. § 2170(b)(5).
51. Id. § 2170(b)(3)(B); 31 C.F.R. § 800.506(d).
52. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(b)(2)(A) (2012).
53. Id. §§ 2170(b)(2)(C).
54. Id. § 2170(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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"negotiate, enter into or impose, and enforce any agreement or condition ... to mitigate
any threat" from the covered transaction to U.S. national security.55 Congress added the
word "impose" to this list in the 2007 amendments to Section 721, suggesting that Con-
gress' intent was that CFIUS in some circumstances could require mitigation measures
without parties' consent.56 The language of the statute now affirms that CFIUS can en-
force not only voluntary agreements with parties, but also involuntarily imposed mitiga-
tion measures, such as those imposed by the CFIUS Interim Order in the Ralls case. 57
In practice, for the vast majority of cases where CFIUS determines that a transaction
presents a risk to national security, that risk is either mitigated through a mitigation agree-
ment, which can take the form of a legally binding agreement between the parties and
CFIUS, or through less formal assurances provided by the parties. If CFIUS and the
parties cannot reach a mutually acceptable agreement, in most cases the parties will with-
draw the voluntary notice of the transaction that it submitted to the Committee and aban-
don the transaction. The alternative is to permit the statutory clock to expire and to force
a decision by the President, commonly referred to as "going to the White House."58
A presidential decision typically is the worst-case scenario for both the parties and the
government. For the parties, a presidential finding that the transaction presents unresolv-
able national security concerns-a finding which the statute requires the President to
make publiclyS9-can cause irreparable reputational harm to a foreign investor. On the
government's side, it forces the President to intervene in a commercial transaction and to
make what is likely, in many cases, a politically unpopular decision. Thus, there is im-
mense pressure for CFIUS and the parties to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. 60
And, importantly, in this process the only leverage that the parties have is the threat of
taking the case to the White House and forcing a presidential decision.61
At the end of its forty-five day investigation, CFIUS prepares and certifies a report. 62 If
no further limitation on the transaction is required, CFIUS submits a report to Con-
gress. 63 If additional action is needed to protect national security, CFIUS submits a re-
port to the President who may then take "such action for such time as the President
considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit" the transaction. 64 The President has up to
fifteen days after the conclusion of the investigation to take such action. 65
55. Id. § 2170(l)(1)(A).
56. H.R. Rep. No. 110-24(1), § 6 (2007), reprinted in 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. 102, 102 (emphasis added).
57. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(l)(1)(A).
58. See, e.g., Stacey Higginbotham, Huawei Wins Some, Loses Some in the U.S., G ioM (Feb. 23, 2011, 7:20
AM), http://gigaom.com/2011/02/23/huawei-wins-some-loses-some-in-the-u-s/ (reporting that Chinese tech
company "Huawei gave up on its $2 million deal to buy [wireless technology] assets [from Motorola] rather
than go to the White House.").
59. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2170(d)(2), (4).
60. See, e.g., Kathleen C. Little, Adrianne L. Goins, & Valerie Ellis, National Security Review Of Foreign
Direct Investments: The Central Role Of Mitigation Agreements, 5 IGC T 25 (Apr. 2008) (noting that, "Although
CFIUS reviews are confidential, congressional pressure on the administration to protect U.S. national secur-
ity interests from unwanted foreign influence has resulted in a process that has, by some accounts, become
highly politicized and rife with uncertainty.").
61. See id.
62. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(b)(3)(B).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 2170 (d)(1).
65. Id. § 2170 (d)(2).
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In its decision addressing the CFIUS framework, the DC Circuit did not question any
of the statutory authorities or timelines for review of a covered transaction either by
CFIUS or by the President.66 The opinion focused on the process of the CFIUS frame-
work, not the substance of CFIUS' or the President's authorities. On remand, however,
the District Court will consider the scope of CFIUS' authority to impose mitigation mea-
sures on a transaction in the absence of presidential action.
C. POLICY CONTEXT
The United States' policy of openness to foreign direct investment-long a cornerstone
of U.S. economic policy-may be more important now than ever. By way of example,
economic studies show that the United States will need an immense amount of capital just
to meet its infrastructure modernization needs in the next two decades. 67 The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce estimates that "more than $8 trillion in new investment will be
needed in U.S. transportation, energy, and wastewater and drinking water (water-related)
infrastructure from 2013 through 2030-totaling some $455 billion per year. In reality, a
much higher amount of investment will likely be necessary. ' 68 Traditional financing
sources for modernizing U.S. infrastructure, however, are unavailable.69 Due to the reces-
sion and other funding imperatives, among other factors, diminishing public ftmds are
available for infrastructure investment.70 "In this context, foreign investors offer a poten-
tially important source of supplemental financing for U.S. infrastructure investment," the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce observes.7r The Obama Administration also identified for-
66. The court did briefly note two statutory constraints on the President's authorities. Before taking action
under Section 721, the President must make two findings: (1) there is "credible evidence" the transaction
threatens U.S. national security, and (2) laws other than Section 721 and the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act do not provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President to take this action.
See Ralls III, 758 F.3d at 303-04 (quoting § 2170(d)(4)).
67. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, From International to Interstates 3 (2013), https://www.uschamber.com/
sites/default/files/legacy/reports/ChinalnfrastructureFinal.pdf. Presently, the American Society of Civil En-
gineers (ASCE) has rated the U.S. infrastructure system with a "D+" on its report card, meaning that "[t]he
infrastructure is in poor to fair condition and mostly below standard, with many elements approaching the
end of their service life. A large portion of the system exhibits significant deterioration. Condition and capac-
ity are of significant concern with strong risk of failure." American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013 Report Card
for America's Infrastructure, Methodology (2013), http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#p/about-the-
report-card/methodology. Since 1998, according to the ASCE's Report Cards, the U.S. infrastructure
grades "have been near failing ... due to delayed maintenance and underinvestment across most categories."
Id. at Executive Summary, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#p/overview/executive-summary.
ASCE now assesses that the United States has "a significant backlog of overdue maintenance across our
infrastructure systems [and] a pressing need for modernization." Id.
68. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 67, at 3.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 9. For example, inflation and rising fuel economy standards impaired the ability of the gas tax to
fully fund the Highway Trust Fund at historical levels. See Devin Braun, Ryan Endorf &Stephen Parker, The
Impact of Fuel Use Trends on the Highway Trust Fund's Present and Future, College of William & Mary, Thomas
Jefferson Program in Public Policy, available at http://www.aednet.org/government/pdf-2013/WM-HTF-
Report.pdf
71. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 67, at 9. The United States is one of the most attractive
destinations for foreign investment in the world. U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Direct Investment in
the United States 1 (2013), availahle at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea-doc 2013
-foreign-direct investment in the us.pdf (noting that the United States has been the largest recipient of
foreign direct investment since 2006, with total foreign investments of more than $1.5 trillion).
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eign direct investment as an important element to the country's road to economic
recovery.72
China is a leading source of potential foreign investment in the United States.73 To
date, foreign direct investment from China has averaged slightly less than $1 billion in
2010-2012, or 0.5 percent of total foreign investment in the United States.74 But the
country is joining the ranks of leading investors in the global economy.75 "Decades of
rapid growth, based on a model that promotes capital formation and external balance of
payments surpluses, have positioned China to be a global financial and direct investor
abroad. China has already become the world's second largest economy, the U.S.'s second
largest goods trading partner, and a significant source of capital for the U.S."76
At the same time, however, China is often viewed as a strategic competitor to the
United States whose actions can present risks to U.S. national security. The U.S.-China
Economic & Security Review Commission, for example, has catalogued "mounting evi-
dence of the Chinese government's ... role in cyber espionage.":: Chinese actors report-
edly have gathered "strategic and economic intelligence on targets in the United States"
including such targets as the U.S. telecommunications company Verizon, Google's
database on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders, U.S. weapons designers, and
the networks of major U.S. newspapers including the Washington Post, the Wall Street Jour-
nal, and the New York Times.7s On May 19, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice filed
indictments against five members of China's People's Liberation Army on charges of
hacking to benefit Chinese industry.79 The Department of Justice also filed charges
against Sinovel Wind Group, a Chinese energy firm, in June 2013, alleging that it stole
intellectual property about wind turbines from a U.S. company.8 0
The United States is thus faced with a critically important policy imperative: how to
permit investment from China and thereby enjoy its benefits, while simultaneously pro-
tecting U.S. national security. This is precisely the job for which CFIUS was created. But
in order to achieve this goal, the limitations that CFIUS places on foreign investment
must be narrowly tailored and carefilly circumscribed; in other words, the limitations
must be no more than is necessary for the protection of U.S. national security. In this
regard, defining the scope of CFIUS' authority in the absence of presidential action is key
to enabling crucial foreign investment in the United States.
72. Mary Bruce, White House Touts Growing Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., ABC NEws BLOCS (Jun.
20, 2011, 12:53pm), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/06/white-house-touts-growing-foreign-
direct-investment-in-the -us/.
73. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 67, at 3.
74. U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, supra note 71, at 5.
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id.
77. US-China Econ. & Sec. Rev. Comm'n, 2013 Ann. Rep. to Congress 243 (2013).
78. Id. at 244-47.
79. Ellen Nakashima, Indictment of PLA Hackers Is Part of Broad U.S. Strategy To Curb Chinese Cyberspying,
WASH. POST (May 22, 2014).
80. US-China Econ. & Sec. Rev. Comm'n, supra note 77, at 248.
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II. Four Limitations on CFIUS' Authority
Section 721 gives CFIUS and the President broad authority to limit foreign direct in-
vestments that present unresolvable U.S. national security concerns.81 Yet these authori-
ties are not and cannot be absolute in the context of a policy of openness to foreign
investment.8 2 Instead, transparency and political accountability are built into the CFIUS
process by statute and regulation through Congressional oversight and public disclosure
of Presidential actions.8 3 Additionally, the Constitution, Section 72 1, and the Department
of the Treasury regulations implementing Section 721 place meaningfil limitations on
CFIUS' authority to impose mitigation measures absent a presidential determination.84
The scope of CFIUS' authority is of critical importance to parties whose transactions
are before the Committee because only the rarest of cases will ever proceed to a Presiden-
tial determination. Indeed, the President has exercised his authority under Section 721 to
block a transaction only twice. Instead, parties to a transaction before CFIUS typically
will withdraw their notice to the Committee and abandon the transaction if CFIUS de-
mands mitigation measures that are unacceptable to the parties or it becomes apparent
that CFIUS is likely to recommend that the President block the transaction. Moreover,
the threat of taking the case to the White House and forcing a presidential decision is the
only leverage the parties have to negotiate a mitigation agreement that is acceptable from
a commercial perspective. Thus, the scope of CFIUS' independent authority-in the ab-
sence of a presidential determination-is of critical importance to the ftinctioning of the
CFIUS process and to the fair and equitable treatment of foreign investors.
A. DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON CFIUS INTERIM ORDERS
As an initial matter, CFIUS' power is fuidamentally limited by the U.S. Constitution.
CFIUS ultimately derives its power from the grant of authority in Section 721, which in
81. "National security" is broadly defined in the statute as "includ[ing] those issues relating to 'homeland
security', including its application to critical infrastructure." 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(a)(5) (2012). Congress
added this definition in the aftermath of the political reaction to the acquisition in 2006 by United Arab
Emirates state-owned company of a management contracts for six major U.S. ports. See Peter Overby, Lobby-
ist's Last-Minute Bid Set Off Ports Controversy, NPR (Mar. 8, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story
.php?storyld=5252263.
82. Congress, by statutory design, affirmed that CFIUS is consistent with and promotes this open invest-
ment policy. In the preamble to FINSA, Congress states that the purpose of the Act is "[t]o ensure national
security while promoting foreign investment and the creation and maintenance of jobs." Guidance Concern-
ing the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed.
Reg. 236, 74567, 74568 (Dec. 8, 2008). A policy of promoting trade is why the Secretary of the Treasury
chairs the Committee, and not one of the security agencies. See 50 U.S.C. App.§ 2170(k)(3). That is also
why CFIUS does not screen all foreign mergers and acquisitions in the United States, but only those impli-
cating national security concerns. Department of the Treasury, Guidance Concerning the National Security
Review Conducted by CFIUS on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74567, 74568 (Dec.
8, 2008).
83. In 2007, Congress expressed concern about CFIUS' "accountability to Congress and the public" given
that the reviews and investigations are "highly confidential." S.Rep. No. 110-80, at 3 (2007). Congress
amended the CFIUS framework that year to "improve[ ] accountability" and "establish[ ] clear and transpar-
ent processes for examining proposed investment." H.R. Rep. No. 110-24(I), at 11 (2007), as reprinted in
2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. 102, 104. The resulting amendments to the statue "enhance[d] Congress's ability to
perform its necessary oversight of the CFIUS process." Id. at 7.
84. Id.
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turn is predicated on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.85 Unlike many other
regulatory bodies, however, the contours of CFIUS' authority had never been tested in
the courts until the Ralls case. The key result of the DC Circuit's Ralls decision is that a
party to a transaction, if it acquires a constitutionally recognized property interest through
a transaction, must have the opportunity to review and to rebut unclassified evidence
before the President intervenes in the transaction.8 6 At the same time, a party has no right
to seek review of the President's substantive decision in federal courts.8 The DC Circuit
did not decide, though, at what point those due process rights attach to a party to a trans-
action or how to implement changes to protect those rights in the existing CFIUS frame-
worLk8 8 On remand, the District Court must consider the application of due process
rights in the context of CFIUS' Interim Order.8 9
The rights to view and to rebut evidence are core to the due process right.90 In this
case, CFIUS imposed its Interim Order after asking Ralls a number of follow-up questions
and giving Ralls an opportunity to answer them.9 1 Ralls also had one meeting with
CFIUS, but CFIUS did not provide or discuss with Ralls any evidence it had obtained or
was reviewing.92 The DC Circuit held that such one-way communication between
CFIUS and Ralls was inadequate: "That Ralls had the opportunity to present evidence to
CFIUS and to interact with it, then, is plainly not enough to satisfy due process because
Ralls never had the opportunity to tailor its submission to the [government's] concerns or
rebut the factual premises underlying the President's action." 93 CFIUS' existing proce-
dures therefore do not meet the requirements of due process. 94
The DC Circuit also implicitly held that due process does not permit a party to a cov-
ered transaction to contest the substantive action in court once it is made.9 The court
noted that Ralls' challenge was reviewable and a justiciable question because Ralls did not
contest the President's substantive determinations or actions.96 It noted, "Ralls's due pro-
cess claim does not challenge (1) the President's determination that its acquisition of the
Project Companies threatens the national security or (2) the President's prohibition of the
transaction in order to mitigate the national security threat."97 The statute bars judicial
review of these substantive matters, but the question of adequate due process is a matter
for the court to decide.
The Ralls decision clarifies that a party to a transaction is entitled to due process within
the CFIUS framework, but it also raises two open questions concerning the scope of the
due process right. First, when do due process rights attach? Second, how can CFIUS
integrate these due process requirements into its existing procedures?
85. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.




90. See id. at 318.
91. Rals I, 926 F. Supp. 2d 71, 79 (D.D.C. 2013).
92. Id.
93. Ralls III, 758 F.3d at 316.
94. Id. at 319.
95. Id. at 320.
96. Id. at 314.
97. Id. (emphasis in original).
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To be consistent with case law and the statutory framework, a party to any transaction
under CFIUS review must have due process rights. Rails' unique procedural history fac-
tored into the D.C. Circuit's decision that the company was entitled to due process, but
the right to due process does not apply solely to companies in this procedural posture. 98
Ralls consummated the transaction before notifying CFIUS and thereby possessed state
law property interests in the wind farm companies. 99 The more common practice for
transactions that fall within CFIUS' jurisdiction, and that potentially implicate national
security concerns, is for parties to submit a voluntary notice to CFIUS before completing
the transaction. Companies do so for practical purposes, seeking to avoid or mitigate the
business risk of adverse action from CFIUS before the terms of the transaction are fily
settled.100 Yet according to the DC Circuit, Ralls's property interests were only "fily
vested upon the completion of the transaction, meaning due process protections necessarily
attached."'' 1 This statement cannot be understood to mean that due process rights turn
upon the completion of the transaction, however, as that would be inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's due process case law, as well as the DC Circuit's analysis and the CFIUS
process. Rather, due process rights must attach for the parties to any covered transaction
CFIUS reviews, regardless of when CFIUS receives notification of that transaction.
The Supreme Court has held that, "[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire and more than a unilateral expecta-
tion of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."102 Thus, a
teacher recently hired without tenure or a formal contract, but nonetheless with a clearly
implied promise of continued employment, has a due process right to a hearing before
dismissal from public employment.103 And where entitlement to welfare payments is es-
tablished by a statute defining eligibility, potential welfare recipients have a due process
right to a hearing to attempt to establish that eligibility. 0 4 By the Court's precedents,
then, an entity need not show vested property rights in order to have a due process right.
The entity need only make a legitimate claim of entitlement to that property right, even if
certain prerequisites must be met before the property right is filly vested.
The DC Circuit's opinion in Ralls is consistent with this view of the law. The court
reiterated that "the Constitution protects rather than creates property interests," and
those property interests are defined by reference to "independent sources such as state
law."105 In the CFIUS framework, the parties to any transaction under CFIUS review
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a state property right.10 6
98. Rails III, 758 F.3d at 315.
99. Id.
100. For a fuller examination of the dangers of "non-notified" transactions, see David N. Fagan, Mark E.
Plotkin, &Jonathan R. Wakely, The Rails Case: Lessonsfor Foreign Investors, 8 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J.
198 (2013).
101. Rails III, 758 F.3d at 316 (emphasis added).
102. Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (internal quotation marks oritted).
103. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (discussing Conell v. Higgin-
botham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971)).
104. See id. (discussing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
105. Rails III, 758 F.3d at 315 (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998)).
106. See id. at 316.
VOL. 48, NO. 2
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
RALLS ON REMAND 117
The DC Circuit also distinguished Dames 6& Moore v. Regan, a case that, like Ralls,
involved national security implications.10 7 There, the Supreme Court held that the prop-
erty right an entity acquired was contingent upon a license from the Office of Foreign
Assets Control.10s Because "attachments of Iranian property were 'null and void' unless
licensed," the DC Circuit observed in Ralls, "Dames & Moore obtained its right to attach
only after it was licensed by the Government, which license was itself revocable at any
time and, presumably, for any reason." 10 9 Thus, Dames & Moore's property interest was
"contingent at best."IIO But in Ralls, "[tlhere is no contingency built into the state law
from which Ralls' property interests derive and to which interests due process protections
traditionally apply." ' The property interests of a party to a covered transaction are not
contingent upon CFIUS approval, because CFIUS can only limit transactions-and the
President can only suspend or prohibit a transaction-for national security purposes, not
"for any reason."1 1 Accordingly, the DC Circuit properly found the licensing program in
Dames 6& Moore distinguishable from the CFIUS process. 113 Parties to a transaction seek-
ing pre-approval for the transaction have a vested due process right and are entitled to due
process before CFIUS. 114
The DC Circuit also specifically rejected the District Court's holding that Ralls waived
its due process right by failing to seek pre-approval of the transaction."5 It distinguished
other circuit courts' cases in which parties voluntarily waived their rights to a hearing or
remedies, holding that failure to seek pre-approval does not constitute waiver "when the
regulatory scheme expressly contemplates that a party to a covered transaction may re-
quest approval ... either before or after the transaction is completed."116 If parties seeking
pre-approval might be able to waive due process rights, as this statement implies, then
those rights must have already attached.
Interpreting due process protections to attach only after consummation of a transaction
would also create bizarre incentives and serious problems of administrability. If the Com-
mittee had no obligation to provide due process to parties seeking its pre-approval for a
transaction, it would incentivize parties to complete the transaction before notifying
CFIUS so they could enter the CFIUS process with the right to due process. Such an
outcome is starkly contrary to the statutory framework, which promotes voluntary early
notification to CFIUS.11 7 The voluntary reporting system is better for CFIUS, because it
permits the Committee to focus on the small minority of foreign investments that may
present national security concerns. The system also benefits transaction parties, who
would likely undertake the costs and delays associated with a review by CFIUS only if the
transaction potentially implicates national security concerns. Consistent with Section
72 1's statutory purposes, then, the District Court should hold on remand that due process
107. Id.; 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
108. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 672-73.
109. Rails III, 758 F.3d at 316 (quoting id.).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 316-17.
112. Id. at 316; c. Dames &Moore, 453 U.S. at 672-73.
113. Rails III, 758 F.3d at 316.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 317.
116. Id.
117. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(C)(i) (2012).
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rights attach to all parties prior to CFIUS review. CFIUS must afford due process to the
parties to any covered transaction it reviews or investigates, whether the parties provide
notice to CFIUS before or after the transaction is complete. 1 s
The second question raised by the DC Circuit's decision is what adjustments to CFIUS'
practices are required to ensure the protection of parties' due process rights.119 The DC
Circuit addressed only Ralls' due process right with respect to the Presidential Order
suspending the transaction, and remanded for consideration of due process before the
Committee. 120 It noted, though, that, "[a]dequate process at the [CFIUS] stage ... would
also satisfy the President's due process obligation."121 Accordingly, parties to a transac-
tion have a due process right to review and rebut CFIUS' unclassified evidence before the
Committee imposes mitigation measures as well.122 CFIUS could integrate this right into
its review and investigation process by providing unclassified evidence and an opportunity
to rebut that evidence during the negotiations it already conducts with parties to a transac-
tion. Alternatively, it could initiate a more formal hearing to be held only when negotia-
tions reach an impasse and the Committee contemplates imposing mitigation measures
without the consent of the parties. 123 Also, because "the President acts only after review-
ing the record compiled by CFIUS and CFIUS's recommendation," a party is not entitled
to due process twice, once with CFIUS and once with the President; due process before
CFIUS will suffice. 12 4
The DC Circuit specifically left open the question of whether the executive privilege
shields the disclosure of unclassified information as evidence that Ralls has the right to
review and to rebut. 125 Under the executive privilege, a President's conversations and
communications related to "the process of shaping policies and making decisions" are
exempt from disclosure, except where "essential" in a criminal case. 126 As the CFIUS
process is not criminal, the open question is whether the CFIUS documents are part of
the President's deliberative process. 127 CFIUS' analyses and recommendations may well
be, but the underlying evidence likely falls outside the privilege and must be disclosed.
Either way, the unclassified information that Ralls is entitled to review will almost cer-
tainly not address all of the President's U.S. national security concerns. Those concerns
were heavily informed by classified analysis, but the DC Circuit held that Ralls has no
right to access classified evidence. 128 The company's opportunity to rebut adverse evi-
dence may actually be quite limited in practice.
118. See Rails Ill, 758 F.3d at 317.
119. Id. at 317-18.
120. Id. at 320-21.
121. Id. at 320.
122. Id.
123. For a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which CFIUS could comply with the Raills III decision, see
Covington & Burling, Update on CIUS Developments: Perspectives on the U.S. Court ofAppeals Decision in Rails 6
(2014), available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/31ff75db- 36f3-4fd4-ScO- 01 f98039903/Presenta
tion/PublicationAttachment/a12b96f3-73eb-40e4-9ece-08c7l6aa7711/Update-onCFIUSDevelopments_
Perspectives on the U.S. Court of AppealsDecision in Ralls.pdf.
124. See id. at 2; Rails III, 758 F.3d at 320.
125. Update on CIUS Developments: Perspectives on the US Court ofAppeals Decision in Rails, supra note 123, at
3.
126. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708-13 (1974).
127. See id.
128. Raills III, 758 F.3d at 319.
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The District Court established procedures for granting Ralls access to the unclassified
evidence underpinning CFIUS's recommendation to the President in its November 6,
2014 Order implementing the DC Circuit's judgment. 2 9 CFIUS could apply this frame-
work in fiture cases where a party has a due process right to evidence before the Commit-
tee issues an order. Here, the District Court ordered CFIUS to provide to Ralls "all
unclassified factual findings or evidence underlying CFIUS's recommendation to the
President."'130 If CFIUS objected on the basis of executive privilege, the District Court
ordered that they must "submit a privilege log to [Ralls] and the Court identifying the
material withheld and reasons for the withholding," as well as whether the document was
allegedly exempt from disclosure as an executive communication or as part of the delibera-
tive process, as well as a substantiation of the privilege.131 The court also gave Ralls an
opportnity to object to the assertion of the privilege.132 In late November, CFIUS deliv-
ered 3,487 pages of documents relating to its decision in this case. It reportedly withheld
"only sections of two documents under the assertion of executive privilege."' 133
The requirement for detailed substantiation of a privilege claim indicates that the court
will carefilly review such claims with an eye towards protecting Ralls' due process rights.
And the government's limited invocation of this claim comports with this view, implying
that the government might expect the court to carefilly protect Ralls' due process inter-
ests going forward.
B. LIMITS ON THE SCOPE OF CFIUS INTERIM ORDERS
In addition to the Constitutional due process limitations on CFIUS' authority, the text
and legislative history of Section 721 also suggest that the Committee's authority to im-
pose mitigation measures is not absolute. Statutory provisions are to be read by reference
to the entire act and in a manner that does not render other provisions of the act superflu-
ous.1 34 Here, the statutory grant of authority to CFIUS to "negotiate, enter into or im-
pose, and enforce" mitigation agreements must be read not in isolation, but in conjunction
with the grant of authority to the President to take action to "suspend or prohibit" any
covered transaction based on a finding that the transaction threatens to impair national
security. 135 To conclude otherwise would render superfluous the President's role in the





133. James Rosen, Chinese firm gets big cache of U.S. government documents in unprecedented exchange
over wind-farm dispute, McClatchyDC (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/11/26/248313/
chinese- firm-gets-big- cache- of.html#storylink=cpy.
134. See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Andrew, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) ("It is a cardinal principal of statutory construc-
tion that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence,
or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant." (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)))
(internal quotation marks omitted); Pollard v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 852 (2001)
("[WVe must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law" (quoting Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 99 (1992))) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
135. Compare 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(l)(1)(A) (2012) with § 2170(d)(1).
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statutory scheme and frustrate the congressional purposes of promoting investment, im-
proving political accountability, and strengthening congressional oversight.
In our view, CFIUS encroaches on the authority assigned to the President when the
mitigation measures it demands are the functional equivalent of "suspend[ing] or pro-
hibit[ing] a transaction," a power which the statute entrusts to the sole power of the Presi-
dent.136 CFIUS cannot block a transaction on its own authority; only the President has
that power. 37 The DC Circuit also recognized this limitation.13  In discussing the time-
line of CFIUS and Presidential actions, it noted that CFIUS may not, by itself, perma-
nently suspend or prohibit a covered transaction. 39 Instead, "if CFIUS effectively freezes
a transaction . . . and believes the freeze should remain in place after its seventy-five day
action period concludes, it must submit the matter to the President."1 4
The legislative history of Section 721 supports the conclusion that Congress intended
CFIUS' mitigation authority to be limited.' 4 1 Congress expanded CFIUS' authorities in
the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA). 42 Before then,
CFIUS entered into mitigation agreements only with the consent of the parties. 143 If the
parties refused to agree to the proposed mitigation measures, CFIUS could either approve
the transaction or send it to the President for his action. 144 FINSA added that CFIUS
could also "impose" mitigation measures on the parties. 45
Congress did not extend CFIUS' authority any further, though, or re-delegate the au-
thority to suspend or prohibit transactions from the President. A report by the House
Financial Services Committee, which has jurisdiction over CFIUS, states that "[CFIUS
mitigation] agreements are intended to mitigate the possible national security threats
posed by a transaction short of requiring that the parties abandon the transaction altogether."'146
The Report further states, "The Committee believes that mitigation agreements play a
critical role in the CFIUS process, allowing CFIUS to fully address security concerns
without resorting to an outright rejection of the transaction when concerns arise."147 This phras-
ing suggests that Congress never contemplated that mitigation measures would amount to
an outright rejection of the transaction. Thus Congress did not intend the scope of
CFIUS' authority to include imposition of measures that would effectively force the par-
ties to abandon the transaction.
There is no accepted standard for when this line is crossed, and nearly any mitigation
measure will impose some economic cost on the parties that renders the proposed deal less
commercially valuable. Parties regularly agree to mitigation agreements, however, pre-
sumably because they believe the commercial benefits of the transaction outweigh the
costs imposed by the mitigation measures. Nevertheless, as discussed above, it is logical to
136. Id. § 2170(d).
137. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.506(b) (2014).
138. Rails III, 758 F.3d at 322.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 322-23.
141. H. R. Rep. No. 110-24(l), at 12-13 (2007), reprinted in 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. 102, 105-07.
142. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Star. 246 (2007).
143. Id.
144. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d) (2006).
145. Id. § 2170(l)(1)(A) (2012).
146. H.R. Rep. No. 110-24(1), at 11 (2007), reprinted in 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. 102, 104 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
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conclude that CFIUS' mitigation measures cross the line and finctionally block a transac-
tion when they are so onerous that the transaction becomes commercially unreasonable.
For example, CFIUS could demand that a transaction exclude a purchaser from acquiring
the core assets of the target company, or alternatively could demand compliance with
terms so financially burdensome or commercially impracticable as to defeat the viability of
the transaction. At this point, the mitigation measure has destroyed the commercial pur-
pose of the proposed deal. If CFIUS' authority extends so far as to permit imposition of
such measures, there would be no need for the separate grant of power to the President.
The reasons for limiting CFIUS' mitigation authority to measures short of blocking a
transaction are also implicit in the statutory framework. Section 721 provides political
accountability for the CFIUS process: CFIUS must provide a certified report to Congress
of each transaction it reviews, brief Congress on a covered transaction upon request, and
provide an annual report to Congress. 48 According to the report by the House Financial
Services Committee, the legislation requires "reporting to Congress regularly and clearly
on CFIUS actions so that Congress can perform its necessary oversight."149 Additionally,
while CFIUS operates in secret and its interim orders need not be publicly disclosed, the
statute and regulations require that any Presidential order be public.150 Since blocking a
transaction is a severe measure, Congress' intent presumably was to require transparency
and accountability, as opposed to actions by CFIUS, which are secret.
On remand, the District Court will consider whether the CFIUS Interim Order ex-
ceeded the Committee's authority. The Interim Order required Ralls to cease all con-
struction and operations, to remove all stockpiled or stored items from the sites, and to
end all access to the sites except for removal of items by U.S. citizens.' 5' It also prohibited
the sale of the wind farm companies or their assets to any third party until Ralls met
certain conditions, including notifying CFIUS of the intended purchaser and receiving no
objection. 5 2 While we believe it is a close call, we ultimately must conclude that the
Interim Order deprived Ralls of substantially all of the value of the transaction. Ralls
could not use any of the sites and lost the value of any non-removable improvements it
had made to them. Ralls' employees, other than U.S. citizens, could not even access the
site under the terms of the Interim Order. 5 3 Moreover, Ralls could not recoup any value
from the assets by selling them until Ralls had removed-through CFIUS-approved con-
tractors-all items installed at the wind farm sites (including concrete foundations), noti-
fied CFIUS of the proposed purchaser, and received no objection.' 5 4 CFIUS could not
block the transaction from taking place because Ralls had already completed it, but
CFIUS in effect blocked all firther economic activity by Rails related to the transaction.
Though Ralls was not ordered to divest its interest completely until President Obama
issued the Presidential Order, CFIUS' Interim Order effectively denied Rails any eco-
nomic benefit from the transaction for a substantial period of time. In our view, the
148. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2170(a)(3), (g)(1), (m).
149. H.R. Rep. No. 110-24(I), at 11 (2007), reprinted in 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. 102, 104.
150. See 50 U.S.C. § 2170(d).
151. Order Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by Ralls Corporation,
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CEIUS Interim Order exceeded the scope of the Committee's authority because it de-
stroyed the commercial value of the transaction and was tantamount to a prohibition or
suspension of the transaction, a power that CFIUS does not hold.SS
To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that the U.S. government cannot timely inter-
vene in a transaction when CFIUS has identified that the transaction implicates a risk to
U.S. national security and that risk cannot be mitigated through under other legal author-
ities.' 5 6 To the contrary, Section 721 expressly contemplates that the Executive Branch
might take action to block or to "unwind" a transaction-or return the circumstances to
the status quo ante-as CFIUS' Interim Order sought to do.' 5 But Congress specifically
reserved that authority to the President, not CFIUS. 58 Moreover, there is no question
that Section 721 provides CFIUS the authority to take interim measures-including in-
voluntarily imposed mitigation measures-to protect national security when parties
choose to consummate a transaction without undergoing CFIUS review.'5 9 As explained
above, we believe it is a close call whether CFIUS' Interim Order exceeded this authority
and strayed into the power reserved to the President. We conclude that the Interim Or-
der did exceed CFIUS' authority, though, in part because the Interim Order prohibited
Ralls from selling the assets without meeting certain conditions. Had CFIUS not in-
cluded this limitation on Ralls' right to sell the asset, we believe there would be a much
stronger case that CFIUS was within its authority under Section 721.
Put another way, Section 721 contemplates two types of government intervention in
commercial transactions: (1) those measures which affect the rights of the parties and
decrease the value of the transaction to one or both parties, but which permit the transac-
tion to proceed on commercially reasonable terms; and (2) those measures which have the
effect of blocking or suspending the transaction. The first category of measures CFIUS
may impose on its own authority (and in secret) in the interim period before the President
acts. But the second category of Executive Branch measures represents a much more
serious and potentially damaging action in the context of the United States' policy of
155. Ralls also argued before the District Court that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, CFIUS can-
not limit transactions in ways that are outside the jurisdiction of Section 721. Compl. T 59, 94 (Sept. 12,
2012) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012)). Section 721 limits CFIUS' oversight to transactions "which could
result in foreign control of any person." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3). The CFIUS Interim Order bars Ralls
from "sell[ing] or otherwise transfer[ring]" the wind farms or their assets "to any third party," and Ralls
argues that CFIUS cannot bar it from transferring the wind farms to an American company. CFIUS Interim
Order, § 1(d), (e) (emphasis added). The District Court did not analyze this argument because it held that
Ralls' objections to the CFIUS Interim Order were moot. Rails I, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 99. This argument fails
in practice. Congress could not have intended to give CFIUS authority to impose mitigation measures in-
cluding divestitures, and at the same time disallow the Committee from regulating the terms of those divesti-
tures. The administration of mitigation measures must be part and parcel of its authority to impose those
measures.
156. The U.S. government may, of course, take law enforcement action if a transaction violates, for example,
the Espionage Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 792 et seq. (2012). Section 721 also contemplates that the President may
have authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to intervene in a transaction. See 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(4)(B); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707.
157. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(3).
158. 50 U.S.C. §2170(d)(3) (providing that, "The President may direct the Attorney General of the United
States to seek appropriate relief, including divestment relief, in the district courts of the United States, in
order to implement and enforce this subsection.").
159. Update on CFIUS Developments. Perspectives on the US Court of Appeals Decision in Ralls, supra note 123.
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openness to foreign investment. Therefore, such actions are subjected to heightened pro-
tections and accountability, including a Presidential finding and a public statement.
As a procedural matter, therefore, the Executive Branch could have achieved the same
result in Ralls in a manner consistent with Section 721 (assuming it also afforded Ralls the
due process required by the DC circuit decision). Instead of issuing the Interim Order on
its own authority, CFIUS instead could have recommended that the President issue an
order to the same effect. While the President customarily would not act in a CFIUS case
prior to the expiration of the seventy-five day review and investigation period, there is
nothing in Section 721 that would prevent CFIUS from issuing a recommendation to the
President, or the President from acting, prior to the end of the review period. 160 Thus,
the Executive Branch could have achieved the intended result from a national security
perspective while preserving the accountability that Section 721 requires. In sum, our
reading of the statute in no way limits the federal government's authority to take action to
protect U.S. national security; the statute simply requires that it is the President, and not
CFIUS, who does so.
C. TEMPORAL LuMITS ON CFIUS' ORDERS
As explained above, CFIUS' authorities under Section 721 must be interpreted in light
of the separate grant of power to the President. If only the President is empowered per-
manently to block a transaction, then it follows that CFIUS' authority must be somewhat
narrower in scope than the President's, both with respect to the effect on the transaction
and with respect to the effective length of the mitigation measure.
In this context, it is important to note that we are referring only to mitigation measures
that CFIUS imposes pursuant to its Section 721 authority, 16 1 such as the Interim Order in
Ralls, and not mitigation agreements that parties voluntarily enter as a condition of
CFIUS approval. Indeed, CFIUS has required long-term commitments from the parties
to a transaction, such as limitations on who can access a business' technology, require-
ments to provide the U.S. government with access to records, and obligations to make
reports to the U.S. government. CFIUS is authorized to evaluate ongoing compliance
with any mitigation measures, provided it does not place "unnecessary burdens on a party
to a covered transaction."' 162
For mitigation measures that CFIUS imposes on the parties without their consent, such
orders cannot last longer than the statutory period preceding presidential action. As a
practical matter, that means that CFIUS interim orders are limited in effect to a maximum
of a ninety-day time frame. CFIUS has thirty days to conduct a review of a covered
transaction. 16 3 If the threat is not mitigated during review, CFIUS enters an investigation
period that lasts no more than forty-five days. 164 Then, the President has up to fifteen
days to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction. 165 The DC Circuit adopted this
160. 50 U.S.C. § 2170(d)(2) (providing that the President "shall announce the decision on whether or not to
take action . . . not later than 15 days" after CFJUS' investigation is complete).
161. See 50 U.S.C. § 2170(l)(1)(A).
162. Id. § 2170(l)(3)(B)(ii).
163. See id. § 2170(b)(1)(E).
164. Id. § 2170(b)(2)(C).
165. Id. § 2170(d)(2).
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reasoning: "Because the President must issue a decision within fifteen days,... no CFIUS
order freezing a transaction can last for more than ninety days before it expires or is
superseded by a presidential decision."1 66
While it may appear axiomatic that CFIUS interim orders must be limited in time, the
conclusion that CFIUS lacks authority to impose permanent mitigation measures on par-
ties without their consent is important for another reason. Since Congress added the
word "impose" to the scope of CFIUS' authority in the 2007 amendments to Section 721,
it has not been clear whether CFIUS could prevent the parties to a transaction from seek-
ing a presidential determination by imposing an agreement that mitigates the national
security concern. In other words, CFIUS' imposition of mitigation measures would end
the review process under Section 721, and the parties would have no opportunity to let the
statutory clock expire and "go to the White House." Such an interpretation of CFIUS'
authority would destroy the President's role in the CFIUS framework, as described above,
and would put parties in the impossible position of having commercially unacceptable
terms imposed upon them with no opportunity for review by the President. Such an
interpretation would also destroy the political accountability that is inherent in the Presi-
dent's role in the CFIUS framework. If CFIUS has the authority to impose permanent
mitigation measures without the consent of the parties, then it would be possible for
CFIUS substantially to interfere in the property interests of commercial parties entirely in
secret and with no opportunity for judicial or presidential review. We cannot believe that
such was Congress' intent.
D. GEOGRAPHIC LuMiTs ON CFIUS' INTERM ORDERS
Finally, CFIUS mitigation authority is bounded by certain jurisdictional restraints re-
lated to the geographic location of the business activities concerned. Section 721 provides
that CFIUS may review a transaction "which could result in foreign control of any person
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States."16 7 In turn, the Department of the Trea-
sury's regulations implementing Section 721 provide that the scope of the businesses that
are subject to CFIUS jurisdiction are "any entity, irrespective of the nationality of the
persons that control it, engaged in interstate commerce in the United States, but only to the
extent of its activities in interstate commerce."16s Therefore, the statute and regulations
clearly contemplate that CFIUS' authority-including its authority to impose mitigation
measures-do not extend to business activities which have no relation or interconnection
to interstate commerce.
This interpretation also avoids potentially difficult Constitutional questions concerning
the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to regulate business activities
which may have no nexus to interstate commerce in the United States. For example,
could CFIUS require, as a condition of approval of a transaction, U.S. government inspec-
tion rights at a party's data center located in Europe where the data center is not con-
nected to and otherwise has no nexus to the U.S. business?
A fill examination of such questions is outside the scope of this article. However, the
statutory and regulatory language suggests that CFIUS should have the authority to im-
166. Rails III, 758 F.3d at 322.
167. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3) (emphasis added).
168. 31 C.F.R. § 800.226 (emphasis added).
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pose mitigation measures on business activities only when such activities have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. A similar standard has been applied on other regulatory
contexts. For example, the Sherman Act may apply to conduct outside the United States
only when the conduct has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
domestic trade or commerce." 169 Similarly, Congress in 2010 amended the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act to establish extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion over allegedly fraudulent "conduct occurring outside the United States that has a
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States." 17° Both provisions recognize that
Congress' authority to regulate international trade is limited to situations where those
transactions have substantial domestic effects.
There is therefore reason to conclude that a "substantial effects" test may be an appro-
priate standard to determine the scope of business activities upon which CFIUS may im-
pose or require mitigation measures. This is a complex and important question that has
never been considered in the courts. We believe that it would merit further consideration.
III. Conclusion
Perhaps the most significant policy implication of the Ralls decision is its affirmation of
the integrity of the U.S. legal framework for foreign direct investment. Not only is the
United States open to foreign investment, but it also offers strong protections for inves-
tors. The DC Circuit's decision affirms the importance of transparency and fairness in
regulatory processes. Even though CFUS is inherently a process based on classified in-
formation for the protection of national security, it must provide the affected parties with
due process of law. Additionally, by statute, CFUS power is bounded in scope by what
measures it can impose: it cannot obviate the commercial viability of a transaction, be-
cause only the President has authority to block transactions under the statue. CFUS
imposition of involuntary mitigation measures is also time-bound. And CFUS authority
does not extend to business activities that have no relation or connection to interstate
commerce in the United States.
Within these bounds, and in the policy context of openness to foreign investment, the
CFUS framework must be narrowly tailored and carefully circumscribed to place no
greater limitation on foreign investment than that necessary for the protection of national
security. Appropriately tailored mitigation measures can encourage foreign investment in
the United States from Chinese and other foreign investors while simultaneously enhanc-
ing U.S. national security. 171 As the DC Circuit's decision shows, the President has ro-
bust authorities to protect national security, and the CFUS framework provides more
bounded authorities for the Committee to act on its own before the President intervenes.
Thus, existing U.S. law advances both our security and economic goals in complementary
169. See 15 U.S.C. §6(a) (2012).
170. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 929P(b)(2),
§ 27(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010).
17 1. Hearing on Trends and Implications of Chinese Investment in the United States before the US-China
Security & Review Commission (2013) (testimony of Mark Plotkin, Partner, Covington & Burling), http://
www.nscc.gov/sites/default/files/Plotkin / 20Testimony o20- 20US / 20China o 20Review o2OComiission
%20-% 209%20May%202013.pdf.
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ways. 172 In this manner, CETUS promotes the U.S. policy of open investment and pro-
tects U.S. national security whenever such concerns may arise.
172. See id.
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